Russian Military in Crisis: Not Enough Infantry for Human Wave Offensives

Today, we will discuss how the Russian command continues to rely on questionable tactics aimed at weakening Ukrainian defenses and making advances along the frontline. We will also explore how these choices impact the overall quality of Russian forces and evaluate the sustainability of these efforts considering the significant losses they continue to incur.

Russia’s war tactics against Ukraine have always counted on attrition, marked by relentless assaults aimed at wearing down Ukrainian defenses. This approach focuses on exhausting Ukraine’s military resources, manpower, and morale over time rather than achieving quick, decisive gains. By concentrating attacks on key front lines and infrastructure, Russia seeks to impose a long-term strain on Ukraine’s economy and military capabilities. However, this approach has proven costly for Russia itself, draining its resources and personnel while highlighting issues in coordination, morale, and logistics. Recently, Russia has intensified this strategy to self-destructive extremes, even deploying specialists into infantry assault units to fuel further meat wave attacks.

Firstly, the Russian command continues to depend heavily on infantry-led human wave assaults, resulting in staggering casualties. A recent example comes from the Kurakhove direction, where Russian forces have launched thousands of troops into such brutal frontal assaults, often without armored vehicle support. This tactic, while reckless and costly, partially served its purpose for Russia, until they could not maintain sufficient troops to use as cannon fodder. For instance, in the northern sector of the Kurakhove frontline, Russian advances have significantly slowed after Ukrainian forces successfully repelled numerous intense assaults, killing hundreds of enemy soldiers and destroying many vehicles. This area falls under the responsibility of Russia’s Eastern Military District, which has been severely weakened after a year of intense fighting around Marinka, Novomykhailivka, and nearby settlements. By contrast, the southern portion of this region is managed by the Southern Military District, whose commanders still retain enough reserves to press their offensive, creating significant challenges for Ukrainian defenders.

Russian military bloggers have issued several warnings about how the army high command continues to commit seriously wounded personnel to highly attritional assaults in the Kurakhove direction, even though Russian President Vladimir Putin attempts to posture himself as deeply concerned with the medical treatment of veterans. Putin recently highlighted in a meeting with the Russian government that he had met with disabled veterans who expressed satisfaction with the government’s care and benefits.

As a contradiction, one blogger summarized several such cases by stating that wounded soldiers are not given adequate medical treatment and are instead held as hostages in basements. The only possible option for these troops to receive real treatment is by paying bribes to commanders who will otherwise send them on the offensive as part of assault companies as soon as possible, no matter if they are healthy or not, because of the constant shortage of available personnel in many directions of the frontline.

The military blogger emphasized that the second huge mistake is that the Russian command is not only committing wounded personnel but also newly recruited to the front because it relies on "meat" assaults to sustain the tempo of advances, only resulting in even heavier Russian manpower losses. He claimed that some commanders are even calling these new and inexperienced troops second-rate infantry, and this is not one isolated case but unspoken Russian military tactics.

Thirdly, the Russian command continues to misuse specialized Russian units to reinforce depleted assault units. A soldier in a Russian Reconnaissance Battalion claimed on November 3 that 150th Motorized Rifle Division Commander Major General Vitaly Terekhin disbanded the soldier’s reconnaissance unit and transferred them into severely depleted infantry assault units. The soldier noted that the increased casualty rates of soldiers from specialized units could jeopardize the creation of Russian military-technical support units. A Russian blogger claimed that the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade disbanded its drone unit and moved all operators from it into assault units.

The Institute for the Study of War assesses that efforts by the Russian Ministry of Defense to centralize control over specialist units will likely degrade overall force effectiveness by treating all personnel as interchangeable infantry. This approach risks eroding combat capabilities and has provoked frustration among frontline soldiers. One soldier questioned the rationale, asking how this could solve short-term issues and what the plan would be for sustaining a conflict that shows no signs of ending soon.

Viktor Kevlyuk, an expert at Ukraine’s Center for Defense Strategies, recently highlighted that Russia's military is struggling to maintain quality personnel within its traditionally elite forces. Many Russian special operations troops have been deployed to Ukraine’s front lines, leading to a decline in their overall effectiveness. Kevlyuk noted that only half of the original personnel remain alive, with replacements often being older and less fit. Meanwhile, Russian airborne troops, though well-equipped and active along the frontline, frequently include personnel from motorized rifle units, reserves with minimal training, and even convict recruits, further diminishing their effectiveness.

Overall, these statements reinforce earlier analytical reports about the Russian military's struggle to maintain consistent personnel replacements. Open-source data suggests that in October 2024, Russian forces experienced some of their heaviest losses since the war began. Record casualties have caused the estimated 470,000 Russian troops in Ukraine to dwindle even more, prompting Russian leaders to seek the first batch of 12,000 reinforcements from North Korea. The Institute for the Study of War predicts that Russian authorities will continue low-profile mobilization efforts until general mobilization becomes unavoidable. This includes targeting migrant and non-ethnic Russian communities and offering large payments to recruits. However, these measures have had limited success, leaving Russian offensives heavily reliant on sheer troop numbers for meat wave assaults.

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